Reply to Daniel's Moral Argument for Theism

On X (the site formerly known as Twitter), a Christian apologist named Daniel (last name unknown) claims that objective morality proves atheism. On July 10, 2023, he posted a lengthy thread in which he introduces his argument, clarifies his terms, and answers objections. His argument, which is identical to William Lane Craig's most recent moral argument, is as follows:

(1) If God does not exist, objective moral values and duties could not exist.

(2) Objective moral values and duties do exist.

(3) Therefore, God exists.

The argument is valid: if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true. But are the premises true?

Atheists themselves disagree on whether (2) is true. Among atheist philosophers, Nietzsche and J.L. Mackie are probably the two most famous atheists who deny the existence of objective moral values and duties. But there have been countless atheist philosophers who affirm the existence of objective moral values and duties, including G.E. Moore, Erik Wielenberg, Quentin Smith, Wes Morriston, Michael Martin, David Brink, Michael Huemer, and many others. I count myself in the second group and join Daniel in affirming the truth of his second premise.[1]

What, then, about (1)? Contrary to Daniel (and channeling my inner William Lane Craig), I shall defend two basic contentions. First, Daniel has given no good reason to think that (1) is true. Second, there are good reasons to think that (1) is false. 

1. No Good Reason to Think (1) Is True

1.1. The Inessential Objection

In Part 2.1 of Daniel's thread, he identifies six moral phenomena which he believes to be necessary conditions for the existence of objective morality: (a) objective values; (b) objective duties; (c) objective moral standard; (d) human dignity; (e) free will; (f) real purpose. I will defend the position that four of these (b, d, e, and f) are inessential for the existence of objective morality.

Let's consider each of these in turn.

(a) Objective Values: Daniel claims that objective values are necessary for objective morality. In his words, "values are what make an action or state of affairs GOOD or BAD." I agree. I'm not aware of any philosopher who has defended the idea that morality itself could be objective if there are no objective (moral) values. 

(b) Objective Duties: Although I join Daniel in affirming objective duties, I do not think he adequately defends the claim that they are necessary for objective morality. This can be seen from his own stated definition of "objective morality" in part 4.1 of his thread, where he writes: "in order for morality to be objective, there must be something factually true about moral actions, regardless of opinion." I have no quarrel with his definition. Instead, I would simply point out that, on his own definition of objective morality, objective duties aren't necessary for morality as a whole to be objective. For example, it could be the case that moral values are objective and some version of virtue ethics is true, a version which doesn't involve moral duties at all.  To avoid any potential misunderstandings, I'm not a virtue ethicist. Furthermore, I think objective moral duties exist. But the mere fact that such a view is even possible shows that objective duties are not a necessary precondition for objective morality.

(c) Objective Moral Standard: I want to quote Daniel's exposition of this point in its entirety. He writes:

An objective moral standard: Objective morality means that right and wrong exist FACTUALLY, without any importance of human opinion. Even if the ENTIRE WORLD decide rape is good and fine, it would still be wrong, end of story. Without the existence of God, where would an objective moral standard exist which we could hypothetically go to in order to know what actions are actually right or wrong?

-If God does exist then his perfect nature would be the standard, whatever God would do would be the correct answer, so there WOULD exist a perfect objective moral standard if a perfect God exists.

Unfortunately, this does not explain how a "moral standard" differs from moral values and duties. For my part, I interpret the expression "moral standard" to mean "the set of all objective moral values and duties." But that entails that a "moral standard" is not an independent necessary condition for objective morality.[2]

(d) Human Dignity: As with "moral standard," Daniel does not explicitly define what he means by "human dignity." As I interpret him, he seems to equate "human dignity" with the thesis that humans have objective (moral) value. Assuming that is indeed what he means, the next question is this: why should anyone believe that "human dignity" is a necessary precondition for "objective morality"? As with objective duties, I believe that Daniel's own stated definition of "objective morality" proves that human dignity isn't a necessary condition for "objective morality." Daniel has mixed up moral ontology (objective morality) with general systems of ethics (theories like deontology, consequentialism, etc.). It could be the case that objective morality (in Daniel's sense) exists and that there is no human dignity, either because humans exist without dignity or because humans don't exist at all. For example, suppose that God exists and that God created angels who existed for a million years before God created human beings. During that time, God issues commands to the angels. If one believes, as Daniel does, that some version of Divine Command Theory is true, then God's commands to the angels would constitute their moral duties. This situation would satisfy Daniel's definition of "objective morality" and so proves that human dignity is not necessary for objective morality.

(e) Free Will: Although he doesn't explicitly say this, I take it that by "free will" Daniel means libertarian freedom. Why does he claim that free will is necessary for objective morality? He writes:

If free will does not exist then all our choices would be pre-determined. ...  For a being to be able to be “obligated,” that being must be able to be aware of the obligation AND be able to RESPOND, or not respond, to the obligation. 

But this argument can be easily dispatched by noting that, at best, libertarian freedom is a prerequisite for certain moral concepts, such as moral duties, to be applicable; it is not a prerequisite for objective morality. Furthermore, Daniel evinces no awareness of compatibilism. That position is so named because its defenders believe that determinism is compatible with moral responsibility. In order to show that free will is necessary for objective moral duties, Daniel must first refute compatibilism. He has not done so. Indeed, he has not even tried to do so in his (lengthy) thread.[3]

(f) 'Real' Purpose: According to Daniel, 'real' purpose is necessary for 'real' values to exist. (I've put the word 'real' in scare quotes because the word "purpose" is polysemous and it is question-begging for Daniel to label his view in a way that presupposes it is correct.) He writes: 

In order for objective morality to exist, real purpose must exist. For example, we know if our team scores a touchdown that’s good because we know the rules of football and the goal. However, if there are no rules, no purpose, then there can be no “good” thing. Purpose is required for real values like “good” and “bad” to exist. 

The word “purpose” is polysemous: it has multiple related meanings. In the functional sense of the word, a biological entity has a purpose if it serves a function. In the agential sense of the word, however, the term “purpose” is used to refer to the goals of an agent. To have a purpose on this definition, it does not suffice to show that a thing serves a function. Instead, one must show that a thing aims or strives towards goals selected by an agent. Notice that atheism is compatible with functional purpose but not agential purpose (for humans or the universe as a whole). Charitably interpreted, then, it seems to me that Daniel wants to argue that agential purpose is a necessary condition of objective morality. 

Once again, however, Daniel's ambition is betrayed by his own definition of "objective morality." Recall that Daniel defines "objective morality" as follows:

-in order for morality to be objective, there must be something factually true about moral actions, regardless of opinion. For example, it is true** that it is wrong to torture babies for fun. If morality is not objective then there would be no moral facts, just opinions and preferences. 

I agree with Daniel that a deep connection between a purpose of human life and morality is possible, but I do not agree that it is necessary. To see this, consider Larry Arnhart’s secular version of Natural Law Theory, which he calls Darwinian Natural Right. According to Darwinian Natural Right, the good is the desirable;  by "desirable," Arnhart means the (at least) twenty natural desires that are manifested in diverse ways in all human societies throughout history. As Arnhart explains, Darwinian Natural Right, like Natural Law Theory in general, is a system of hypothetical imperatives:

... natural moral judgment as based on hypothetical imperatives that have a "given/if/then" structure: Given what we know about the nature of human beings and the world in which they live, if we want to pursue happiness while living in society with each other, then we ought to adopt a social structure that conforms to human nature in promoting human happiness in society. So, for example, given what we know about human vulnerability and human propensities to violent aggression, if we want to pursue happiness, peace, and prosperity in our society, then we ought to have laws against murder, rape, assault, and theft. Consequently, the laws against murder, rape, assault, and theft are natural moral laws. I have elaborated this thought in some posts here, here, and here.

Furthermore, Darwinian Natural Right is not based upon a presupposition that human beings were created for a purpose, end, or goal. Therefore, Darwinian Natural Right is an example of an ethical theory which does not presuppose that human beings were created for a purpose. Thus, it is false that 'real' purpose (=objective, agential purpose) is necessary for objective morality. The fact that some things are good for human beings does not presuppose a purpose for the existence of human beings.[4]

Summary: Of Daniel's six moral phenomena, only one (objective moral value) is necessary for objective morality. One item (objective moral standard) is redundant, while the remaining items (objective moral duties, human dignity, free will, and real purpose) are not necessary in order for "objective morality," as he defines it, to exist. 

1.2. The Underdetermination Objection

In this section, I will critically assess Daniel's claim that the first three of his moral phenomena (objective values, objective duties, objective moral standard) are better explained by theism than by atheism. I will argue that theism underdetermines the relationship between God and morality and so by itself theism is not a better explanation than atheism for those phenomena. I call this the underdetermination objection. 

(a) Objective Values: As we saw in the last sub-section, Daniel is charitably interpreted as affirming an agential view of purpose. Similarly, he seems to presuppose this view when defending the idea that theism better accounts for objective values than atheism. He writes:

without God, how can one justify assigning objective values like “good” or “bad” to random actions or states of affairs in a cosmos that just happened to create life by accident? It simply can’t. If there is no God, there is no objective “good,” there is only what IS. It is… what it is. The fact that my grass IS green, says nothing about if it is *GOOD* that my grass happens to be green. Good* implies built in goals, intent, and a way things actually SHOULD be, and this simply cannot exist if there is no builder of everything. Furthermore, values like “goodness” cannot be founded on inanimate objects, but must be rooted in a personal being. An inanimate object like a tree can be neither good nor bad, only personal beings can be good or bad. (italics mine)

Daniel is absolutely correct that one cannot have agential purpose (in his words, "built-in goals, intent") in the absence of a mind assigning such goals and intent. But functional purpose does not require a mind who assigns goals or intent. Again, things can be bad for human beings even if there is no Creator who created human beings for a goal or intent. For example, it is an objective fact that having a Body Mass Index (BMI) of 50 is, in general, bad for human beings. (I use the hedge "in general" to allow for the possibility of outliers, such as competitive bodybuilders who have an extremely high BMI but very little body fat.) This fact ("A BMI of 50 is bad for human beings") is an objective value (or, more accurately, objective disvalue): it does not depend upon the stance or subjective states of any human being. Even if all adult human beings believed it is good to have the highest possible BMI, they would still be wrong. But let that pass.

The deeper problem with Daniel's argument is that theism underdetermines the relationship between God and values. Let's define "theism" as the view that there exists one mental entity ("God") who is all-powerful, all-knowing, morally perfect, and, if anything physical exists, the Creator of anything physical which exists. Because theism entails that, if God exists, God is not any sense dependent upon human beings, the words "morally perfect" imply that God's moral perfection is not in any sense dependent upon the stances or subjective states of any human beings. But what makes God morally perfect, according to theism? The correct answer is "undefined." By itself, theism says nothing about this. If theism is true, it could be the case that the Divine Nature Theory of Axiology (DNT-A) is true (and so moral values are grounded in God's nature). But is also possible and no less likely that moral anti-reductionism is true (and so moral values are "a se" and exist as abstract objects which do not depend upon God). Daniel has confused theism by itself with theism conjoined with an auxiliary hypothesis (either DNT-A or something like it). But the fact, if it is a fact, that "Theism combined with DNT-A explains objective values" doesn't help his argument. Why? Because that argument compares the explanatory power of atheism to theism, not of atheism to theism combined with an auxiliary hypothesis like DNT-A. When we consider only theism itself, it is clear that theism underdetermines God's relationship to moral values. Therefore, theism by itself is not even a potential explanation for objective values. Because theism is not even a potential explanation for objective values, it follows that theism cannot be a "better" explanation for objective values than atheism.

(b) Objective Duties: Daniel's claim about objective duties suffers from essentially the same problem as his claim about objective values: theism underdetermines the relationship between God and moral duties. I agree with Daniel that if theism is true, it is possible that the Divine Command Theory (DCT) is true (and so our moral duties are constitutes by God's commands). Theism, however, does not the entail the truth of DCT. In plain English, if theism is true, it is also possible, and no less likely, that DCT is false and some other theory about moral duty is true. What might that theory be? One option is Natural Law Theory (NLT), which says that moral duties are ultimately grounded in facts about human nature and human flourishing. NLT is, in fact, the moral theory favored by the Catholic Church. Although NLT is compatible with theism, it does not require theism. Darwinian Natural Right, mentioned earlier, is a version of NLT and is entirely compatible with atheism. 

(c) Objective Moral Standard: As explained earlier, I consider "moral standard" to be redundant with "moral value and duty." Accordingly, the underdetermination objection applies here as well.

Summary: Because theism by itself underdetermines the relationship between God and moral values and duties, theism by itself is not even a potential explanation for objective values. Because theism is not even a potential explanation for objective values, it follows that theism cannot be a "better" explanation for objective values than atheism.

1.3. The Prior Obligations Objection

In defense of his claim that moral obligation is better explained by theism than by atheism, Daniel argues that "there are four characteristics of moral obligations which show why atheism cannot account for them." In this section, I will focus solely on the first of those four characteristics; I will address the remaining three characteristics later. Daniel's first characteristic of moral obligations is that they are allegedly the result of authoritative commands. He writes, "Moral obligations are naturally expressed as authoritative commands: as a sovereign being, God is a legitimate authority over all creation." I agree with Daniel that it is possible that moral obligations might be communicated as commands from a legitimate commander, but I do not agree that moral obligations need a command. Moral obligations can also arise directly from moral value and from one's relationship to others. But let that pass. 

Imagine a General Officer issuing a (lawful) order to a squadron of fighter pilots to attack an enemy air base. The General's order creates a duty for the fighter pilots because there exists a prior obligation, for all members of the military, to obey all lawful orders issued by a superior officer. Now assume that God exists and that God commands us to do some action A. "God commands us to do some action A" can make A our moral duty if and only if there exists a prior obligation to obey God's commands. But where did that obligation come from? The following passage from the late J.L. Mackie’s (1982, pp. 114-15) book, Miracle of Theism, makes this point well:

Philosophers from Plato onwards have repeatedly criticized the suggestion that moral obligations are created by God’s commands. The commands of a legitimate human ruler do not create obligations: if such a ruler tells you to do X, this makes it obligatory for you to do X only if it is already obligatory for you to do whatever the ruler tells you (within the sphere in which X lies). The same applies to God. He can make it obligatory for us to do Y by so commanding only because there is first a general obligation for us to obey him. His commands, therefore, cannot be the source of moral obligation in general: for any obligation that they introduce, there must be a more fundamental obligation that they presuppose. This criticism decisively excludes one way in which it might be thought that God could create morality.

To avoid a potential misunderstanding, notice that the Prior Obligations Objection does not deny that God's commands, if God exists and issues commands, cannot be the source of any moral obligations. Rather, the Prior Obligations Objection shows that God, if God exists and issues commands, cannot be the source of all moral obligations. If the moral obligation, "Obey God's commands" isn't the result of a divine command, then why do other moral obligations, such as "Don't torture newborn babies for fun," need to be the result of a divine command? 

1.4. The Moral Axiology vs. Moral Deontology Objection

Daniel's second characteristic of moral obligation is objectivity. Why does Daniel think theism explains the objectivity of moral obligation? He writes, "God is unchanging and perfect, so what God is… is necessarily and objectively good." Daniel has not expressed himself very well. Daniel has confused moral value ("good") with moral obligation ("right"). The fact that God, if God exists, is good does not constitute an argument for believing that theism better explains the objectivity of moral obligation than atheism.

1.5. The Moral Ontology vs. Moral Psychology Objection

Daniel's third characteristic of moral obligation is overridingness. The thesis that moral obligations always override all other considerations is controversial. Kant famously believed that they do and posited the idea of a categorical imperative to explain this feature: one has to do what is morally required regardless of any other ends one might have. Daniel's claim (that theism better explains than atheism the existence of overriding moral obligations) is just that: a claim in need of support. I do not find such support in his thread. My own view is this: I cannot see how theism helps account for the mere existence of overriding moral obligations. At best, theism provides a superior sense of motivation to be moral. But motivation is in the domain of moral psychology, not moral ontology, and the existence of overriding moral obligations, not our attitudes towards them, is a question in moral ontology. So, again, I don't see how theism helps.

1.6. The Lack of a Comparative Argument Objection

Daniel's final characteristic of moral obligation is universality. What reason does he give for thinking that theism better explains the universal nature of moral obligation than atheism? He writes, "Moral obligations are universal: God, as a necessary being, is eternal and governs all of creation, so his will extends over all things, times, and places." I agree with this sentence, but I don't understand why Daniel thinks that supports the claim that theism explains the universal nature of moral obligation.

The deeper problem with his implied argument, however, is purely logical. Imagine two competing explanations (H1 and H2) for some some fact F. Now suppose a defender of H1 makes the following argument:

4. H1 explains F.

Therefore, it is probable that: 

5. H1 explains F better than H2.

I think everyone would agree that such an argument fails because it has a defective logical structure. The conclusion makes a comparative claim: it says that H1 is better than H2. The argument, however, has only a single premise and that premise says nothing at all about H2's ability to explain F. Maybe H2 explains F just as well as H1. Or maybe H2 is an even better explanation than H1. Because the argument does not contain a premise which addresses these possibilities, the argument does not make the conclusion probable.

This is the problem with what Daniel has written regarding theism, atheism, and the universality of moral obligation. Even if it is (or were?) the case that theism explains the universality of moral obligation, Daniel has given no reason at all to think that theism offers a better explanation than atheism. 

Furthermore, moral supervenience is an excellent reason to think that it is false that (theism offers a better explanation than atheism for the universality of moral obligation). To put the point somewhat crudely, by "moral supervenience" I mean the idea that there is no moral difference between two actions or states of affairs without a non-moral difference. Moral supervenience by itself does not favor theism or atheism.

1.7. The False Evidence Objection

In this section, I will argue that three of Daniel's moral phenomena (human dignity, free will, real purpose) do not exist, as he defines them. Since they do not exist, they are in a sense "false evidence." 

Human Dignity: I interpret "dignity" to mean "having moral standing." To say that a person has moral standing is to say that a person can be the beneficiary of a moral duty. For example, a newborn baby has moral standing: I have a moral duty not to torture it for fun even though the baby is unable to understand moral concepts or even understand language.

My own view is that humans have dignity (=moral standing), but not in the way that Daniel seems (?) to think they do. Allow me to explain. I could be wrong, but I think Daniel's view is roughly the following:

(ALL HUMANS) All human beings, regardless of whether they are persons, have moral standing.

(NO NON-HUMAN ANIMALS) No non-human animals, regardless of whether they are persons, have moral standing.

My own view is that both (ALL HUMANS) and (NO NON-HUMAN ANIMALS) are false. What confers moral standing is not species membership, but personhood. Human embryos and humans in permanent vegetative states are not persons; in religious language, we might say "there is no soul attached to such bodies." Furthermore, some non-human animals, including whales, dolphins, elephants, and primates, can also qualify as persons. Like a newborn human baby, they do not understand abstract moral concepts, but they can be harmed from their own internal point of view. 

Free Will: Compared to the amount of time I've spent thinking about metaethics, I've spent little time thinking about free will vs. determinism. In other words, I don't have a "studied view" on the matter. With that caveat out of the way, my own view can be summed up with the following two theses:

(POTENTIAL THEISTIC EVIDENCE) If humans have libertarian freedom, that does seem antecedently more likely on the assumption that theism is true than on the assumption that source physicalism (which entails atheism) is true, and so constitutes some evidence favoring theism over atheism.

(LIBERTARIAN INCOHERENCE) I have reluctantly come to believe that the concept of libertarian freedom is probably incoherent. If it is incoherent, then it isn't an item of evidence at all. 

'Real' Purpose: My response to Daniel regarding purpose is essentially the same as my response regarding free will. If the kind of purpose he has in mind existed, that would be evidence favoring theism over atheism, but I deny that such a purpose exists and Daniel has given no independent evidence to think otherwise.

2. There Is Good Reason to Think (1) Is False

2.1. A Plantinga-Style Argument for the Consistency of Atheism and Moral Obligation

2.1.1. Three Types of Contradictions

Writing in 1955, the late Oxford don J.L. Mackie claimed that evil is logically inconsistent with God’s existence.

In its simplest form the problem is this: God is omnipotent; God is wholly good; and yet evil exists. There seems to be some contradiction between these three propositions, so that if any two of them were true the third would be false. But at the same time all three are essential parts of most theological positions: the theologian, it seems, at once must adhere and cannot consistently adhere to all three.[5]

Consider the following set of propositions: {God is omnipotent; God is wholly good; evil exists}. Mackie claimed that the set is somehow contradictory. But how?

Index: The Evidential Argument from the Holocaust against Theism

This article will serve as a hub for organizing past and future responses to my evidential argument from the Holocaust against theism. 

1: Logical Form of the Argument

The first five steps are a cumulative case based on independent facts about the badness of the Holocaust. Step 1 is an application of Draper's argument from pain and pleasure to the Holocaust; it is defended in the original article.

(1) Naturalism has much more predictive power than Theism does with respect to the biologically gratuitous physical pain experienced by many, if not most, Holocaust victims, i.e., 
Pr(E1 | N) >! Pr(E1 |T).

The next step appeals to the horrendous nature of the Holocaust. I think horrendous evils are much more probable on naturalism than on theism, but that is not the claim I am making here. Because I am making a cumulative case argument, I have to show that each additional item of evidence is more probable on naturalism than on theism, while in effect adding the previous item(s) of evidence into the background information. In probability notation, I need to show Pr(E2 | E1 & N) >! Pr(E2 | E1 & T), not Pr(E2 | N) >! Pr(E2 | T). I defend the former inequality in the original article. 

(2) Naturalism has much more predictive power than Theism does with respect to Holocaust victims who experienced and/or witnessed events so horrific that the events constituted prima facie reasons for each victim to doubt whether the victim's life (given their inclusion in the Holocaust) was a great good to the victim on the whole, i.e.,

Pr(E2 | E1 & N) >! Pr(E2 | E1 & T).

The third step appeals to a specific aspect of the problem of divine hiddenness, the problem of divine silence during suffering, as it relates to Holocaust victims who experienced biologically gratuitous suffering and horrendous evil. Again,  I defend the premise in the original article, but it may be restated in plain English as follows.

(3) Naturalism has much more predictive power than Theism does with respect to the fact that so many victims of the Holocaust did not report feeling God's comforting presence, i.e.,
Pr(E3 | E1 & E2 & N) > Pr(E3 | E1 & E2 & T). 

The fourth step appeals to another aspect of the problem of divine hiddenness, this time focusing on what John Schellenberg calls "former believers" and applying it to Holocaust survivors. Again,  I defend the premise in the original article, but it may be restated in plain English as follows.

(4) Naturalism has much more predictive power than Theism does with respect to the fact that so many devout Jewish survivors of the Holocaust became nonbelievers, i.e.,

Pr(E3 | E1 & E2 & E3 & N) > Pr(E3 | E1 & E2 & E3& T).

From steps 1-4, it follows that:

(5) Naturalism has much more predictive power than Theism does with respect to the Holocaust, i.e., Pr(E | N) >! Pr(E | T).

The next step of the argument is based upon Paul Draper's theory of intrinsic probability, which says that intrinsic probability is determined by modesty, coherence, and nothing else. Because naturalism is both more modest and more coherent than theism, it follows that the intrinsic probability of naturalism is greater than the intrinsic probability of theism. This premise is not defended in my article, but instead may be found in Draper's defense of the second premise in what he calls the "low priors argument." 

Using the word "simplicity" as a more concise way to say "has greater intrinsic probability," we get:

(6) Naturalism is much simpler than Theism. 

The next step of the argument is designed to preempt objections that other items of evidence (such as the finite age of the universe, the life-permitting conditions of the universe, the contingency of the universe, objective moral values, etc.) favor theism and such items of evidence outweigh the evidence represented by E1-E4. The basic strategy is to show that known facts about good and evil, such as E1-E4, decisively outweigh the theistic evidence. This premise is not defended in my article, but instead may be found in Draper's defense of what he calls the "decisive evidence argument." So the seventh step of the argument is:

(7) Any epistemic advantages that Theism has over Naturalism (i.e., any factors that raise the ratio of the probability of Theism to the probability of Naturalism) do not, even when combined, suffice to offset the epistemic advantages that Naturalism has over Theism if premises 5 and 6 are true. 

From steps 5-7, it follows from Bayes' Theorem that:

(8) Theism is probably false. 

The two inferences in this argument--the first from 1-4 to 5 and the second from 5-7 to 8--are deductively correct. Therefore, if there is something wrong with this argument, then there must be something with at least if not more of the six premises (1-4, 6-7).

2: Non-Objections

I classify a reply as a "non-objection" if it does not constitute a defeater to one or more premises of the argument; and if does not challenge the inference of the argument. What follows is a list of some of the non-objections I have seen.

2.1: Dismissive Replies

• "Why bad thing happen if God real?"

2.2: Confused Replies

• "You don't really have an argument. You made a statement. Actually just a subjective inference."
• "No. It's merely evidence."

2.2: Irrelevant Replies

2.2.1. The Concept of "God" 

• Objection: "All this can show is an inconsistency between a particular concept of “God” and that “God” creating the world as you have conceived it."
• Objection: "The argument is presupposed on a false attribution error, i.e., that God's existence is dependent on the absence of suffering. This premise presupposes that God is contingent, rather than necessary; therefore, God is not actually God; because, necessary (i.e., self caused) is an attribute of God. The absence of this attribute, reduces God to the caused, rather than the uncaused causer.  Therefore, the argument does not refute the existence of God; instead, it refutes a subjective idea of God predicated on a different set of attributes to those present in God Himself. Argument rejected on the grounds of false attribution error."

2.2.2. Other Replies

• "If God didn’t exist we wouldn’t know the difference between good and evil."
• "Why single out the Holocaust? The "holocaust" could also describe the 10 million murdered under Stalin, or the 170 million murdered under Mao Tse-tung. Nazism was just one of the atrocities of man against man."

3: Objections

3.1: Objections to Multiple Premises

3.2.1: Flip Objections 

In interscholastic and intercollegiate debate, to "flip" or "turn" argument is to take one of your opponent's arguments and to use it as an argument for your position and/or against theirs. 

Objection: The Holocaust argument presupposes objective (moral) good and evil, but objective (moral) good and evil require God.

Reply: LINK

Objection: The Holocaust argument includes several items in our background information, such as the existence of the universe, conscious beings capable of experiencing pain, and so forth. These things are evidence favoring theism over naturalism.

Reply: First, some items alleged to be theistic evidence, such as the existence of the universe, do not favor theism over naturalism. Second, I agree that at least one fact in our background information, consciousness, favors theism over naturalism. The fact that it favors theism over naturalism does not, by itself, negate the claim that the specific facts identified in the Holocaust argument favor naturalism. 

3.2: Objections to Individual Premises

3.2.1: Objections to (1)
3.2.2: Objections to (2)
3.2.3: Objections to (3)
3.2.4: Objections to (4)
3.2.5: Objections to (5)
3.2.6: Objections to (6)
3.2.7: Objections to (7)

Is It Impossible to Prove Atheism?

(Originally published on 1 September 2023; revised version published on 7 September 2023; revised again on 10 September 2023.)

1: Introduction

“Performative" or "pragmatic inconsistency arguments” attempt to show that some action with respect to some proposition is inconsistent with the proposition. You will sometimes hear people call such propositions “self-defeating,” but that isn’t technically accurate. It isn’t the proposition itself which is self-defeating; it is taking some action with respect to the proposition -- like asserting, believing, or defending it – which is self-defeating. For example, consider the proposition, “It is impossible to know anything.” It is logically possible that the proposition is true, but it is logically inconsistent to know that proposition is true. If you somehow knew that it was true, then you would know that it is false. That’s an example of a performative or pragmatic inconsistency argument.

Here are some other examples of propositions which lend themselves nicely to performative or pragmatic inconsistency arguments:

• "I do not exist."
• "I am dead."
• "I cannot assert or communicate anything."
• "I cannot talk."
• "I don't intend to be understood at all."

All of the above examples involve a first-person ("I") statement, but I'm not sure if a performative or pragmatic inconsistency must be a first-person statement. I'll leave that aside.

2: Exposition

Does atheism involve a pragmatic inconsistency? Before I can discuss this, I first need to define my terms. The word "atheism" is polysemous: it has multiple legitimate meanings. By "metaphysical atheism," I mean the proposition, "God does not exist." By "psychological atheism," I mean the psychological state in which a person lacks the belief that God exists. This post is about metaphysical, not psychological, atheism. For brevity, in the remainder of the post, I will use "atheism" to mean only metaphysical atheism.

According to some thinkers, the action of asserting the truth of atheism is a pragmatic inconsistency. For example, the late Christian philosopher Greg Bahnsen once said:

It's standard fare these days to point out that a universal negative cannot  be proven in an a posteriori fashion.  On the basis of experience, how could I prove universally there is no God? [...] God might be on the back side of the fourth moon of Jupiter.  Since I haven't examined the back side of the fourth moon of Jupiter, it's at least possible that God exists and I haven't encountered him yet.  So to say that there is no God is a very strong claim.  Atheists usually get hammered about that, that they're claiming too much.  In fact, in order to say 'there is no God,' ... you would have to be omniscient.  But if you were omniscient, you would be God. Therefore, the only person who could say 'there is no God' is God.  God  would not deny Himself.  So no one can say there is no God.[1]

This suggests the following argument, which I call the "unprovability of universal negatives argument."

(1) The only way to prove a universal negative in an a posteriori fashion is to exhaustively search for all possible sources of evidence of a thing and find no evidence.

(2) But it is impossible for finite, mortal beings to conduct such a search.

Therefore:

(3) It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to prove a universal negative in an a posteriori fashion.

Defenders of the "unprovability of atheism argument" add two additional steps:

(4) The proposition, "God does not exist," is a universal negative.

From (3) and (4), it follows that:

(5) It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to prove, "God does not exist," in an a posteriori fashion.

In the passage quoted above, however, Bahnsen suggests another argument which adds onto the first five steps. Atheism entails that there is no God, but the action of claiming to know that atheism is true presupposes that the person making that assertion has God-like knowledge. So we have:

(6) The action of claiming to know, "God does not exist," presupposes that the speaker is God. 

From (5) and (6), it follows that:

(7) If a finite, moral being claims to know, "God does not exist," then it is true that God does not exist and it is false that God does not exist.

From (7) and the Law of Noncontradiction, it follows that: 

(8) Any claims made by a finite, mortal being to know, "God does not exist," on an a posteriori basis should not be accepted.

I shall call the inference from (5) - (7) the "pragmatic inconsistency of knowing atheism" argument.  

3: Assessment

I shall argue that both the unprovability of atheism argument and the related pragmatic inconsistency of atheism arguments are unsound.

3.1: The Unprovability of Atheism Argument

Here, again, is the unprovability of atheism argument.

(3) It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to prove a universal negative in an a posteriori fashion.

(4) The proposition, "God does not exist," is a universal negative.

Therefore:

(5) It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to prove, "God does not exist," in an a posteriori fashion.

One immediate problem with this argument is its name. From the fact, if it is a fact, that it is impossible for finite, mortal beings to prove atheism in an a posteriori fashion, it does not follow that it is impossible for such beings to prove atheism in a priori fashion. One or more internal inconsistency arguments against God's existence might be sound. But let that pass.

Some philosophers deny the truth of the second premise, (4). For example, in his famous debate with Frank Zindler, William Lane Craig argued as follows.

[...] the statement that God does not exist is not a universal negative; it’s a singular negative statement. Certainly you can prove negative singular statements such as there is no planet between Venus and the Earth. You could provide arguments to show that a singular negative statement is true [...].[2]

Strictly speaking, the first quoted sentence is correct. Categorical propositions are propositions which assert or deny relationships between classes; universal negatives are categorical propositions which have the form, "No S are P." Atheism is not a universal negative in this strict sense. But the statement, "God does not exist," is the same as saying, "No (existing) thing is God." That restatement of atheism is a universal generalization; it is has the form, "There are no S's."[3] Therefore, a proponent of the unprovability of atheism argument might replace "universal negative" with "universal generalization" yielding the following revised version of the "unprovability of universal negatives argument," which gets renamed as the "unprovability of universal generalizations argument."

(1') The only way to prove a universal generalization in an a posteriori fashion is to exhaustively search for all possible sources of evidence of a thing and find no evidence.

(2) But it is impossible for finite, mortal beings to conduct such a search.

Therefore:

(3') It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to prove a universal generalization in an a posteriori fashion.

The "unprovability of atheism argument" would then become:

(4') The proposition, "God does not exist," is a universal generalization.

Therefore:

(5) It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to prove, "God does not exist," in an a posteriori fashion.

The meaning of the word "prove" is ambiguous, but the last two steps of the pragmatic inconsistency argument (steps 6 and 7) provide a clue. That argument targets not atheism, but what is sometimes called "gnostic atheism," the claim to know that God does not exist. This suggests that, at least for Bahnsen, to "prove" a universal generalization means to succeed in demonstrating that belief in the universal generalization can rise to the level of knowledge. So let's revise the first two arguments one more time.

The "unprovability of universal generalizations argument" gets renamed as the "unknowability of universal generalizations argument."

(1'') The only way to reasonably believe a negative universal generalization on an a posteriori basis is to exhaustively search for all possible sources of evidence of a thing and find no evidence.

(2) But it is impossible for finite, mortal beings to conduct such a search.

Therefore:

(3'') It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to reasonably believe a negative universal generalization in an a posteriori fashion.

Likewise, the "unprovability of atheism argument" becomes the "unknowability of atheism argument."

(4') The proposition, "God does not exist," is a negative universal generalization.

Therefore:

(5') It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to reasonably believe, "God does not exist," on an a posteriori basis.

Now consider the first two premises (steps 1'' and 2) in light of this clarification of "prove." 

The second premise (step 2) is false. Purely on the basis of experience, one can know that at least some negative universal generalizations are true. Some objects or beings are defined in such a way that, if they exist, they exist at a specific location and at a specific time. For example, consider the title, "Seattle Seahawks Superbowl 60 Most Valuable Player (MVP)." Let "NO SEAHAWKS MVP" refer to the negative universal generalization, "The Seattle Seahawks Superbowl 60 MVP does not exist." If the Seattle Seahawks do not advance to Superbowl 60 (or if they advance but do not win), then NO SEAHAWKS MVP is true: the person described by that title does not exist. In that case, an "exhaustive search" doesn't require superhuman or supernatural abilities. One could reasonably believe NO SEAHAWKS MVP by simply watching Superbowl 60 or reading about it after the fact.

One might object that, even in my highly specified example, the inference to NO SEAHAWKS MVP isn't deductively valid; it is at least possible that there is a global media conspiracy to spread misinformation about the outcome of Superbowl 60, one's sensory organs are defective, or one is literally delusional and imagining sense data not received by one's sensory organs. This objection fails because one does not need absolute certainty to be reasonable in holding a belief. Even if one did not know NO SEAHAWKS MVP, one would still be reasonable in believing NO SEAHAWKS MVP. Contrary to what Bahnsen implies, a person can reasonably believe something they don't claim to know. For the same reason, Bahnsen has not given us a good reason to believe that the first premise (step 1'') is true. 

A proponent of the unknowability of atheism argument might grant the above objections and concede that humans can reasonably believe at least some negative universal generalizations, while at the same time insist that there is something special about God such that humans cannot reasonably believe atheism. Here I think it is useful to follow Jeanine Diller in making a distinction between global and local versions of atheism.[4] "Global atheism" is the proposition, "God does not exist," for all concepts of God, including concepts of God which no one has yet even considered. In contrast, "local atheism" is the proposition, "God does not exist," for a specific concept of God. This distinction suggests two further versions of the "unknowability of atheism" argument.

I will call the first of these two versions the "unknowability of global atheism" argument.

(1*) The only way to reasonably believe global atheism on an a posteriori basis is to exhaustively search for all possible sources of evidence of God, for every possible concept of God, and find no evidence.

(2) But it is impossible for finite, mortal beings to conduct such a search.

Therefore: 

(5*) It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to reasonably believe global atheism on an a posteriori basis.

The second version, of course, is the "unknowability of local atheism" argument.

(1**) The only way to reasonably believe local atheism on an a posteriori basis is to exhaustively search for all possible sources of evidence of God, for a single concept of God, and find no evidence.

(2) But it is impossible for finite, mortal beings to conduct such a search.

Therefore: 

(5**) It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to reasonably believe local atheism on an a posteriori basis.

The first argument is, I believe, much more promising than the second. In light of the fact that there are surely legitimate concepts of "God" which no human has ever conceived, it is difficult to imagine how, on the basis of experience, one could be confident in the belief that all local theisms are false. In other words, in the context of global atheism, the second premise (step 2) seems to be true. Of course, the fact that I cannot conceive of such a justification does not rule out the possibility that one exists. But it seems unlikely that anyone in the year 2023 could reasonably believe global atheism is true. As John Schellenberg has persuasively argued, there are numerous signs of 

human intellectual immaturity at the macro level, and we've seen enough evidence of it to say that maturity--the realization (or near realization) of a deep and wide understanding of reality--may yet be a long way off.[5]

Further support for Schellenberg's immaturity hypothesis comes from the work of Paul Draper. In a recent article, Draper explores the conjunction of "merotheism" (God is a proper part of nature) and "monopsychism" (there is exactly one mind or subject of consciousness). He calls this novel version of theism "panpsychotheism" (all-minds-[are]-God-ism).[6] The important point to notice here is that, although some of the greatest minds in history have thought about God, there is no indication that anyone else had thought of this view. All by itself, this single example is evidence that there are other conceptions of God which no one has previously conceived. 

In contrast, I think the second argument fails and for essentially the same reason given earlier. At least some God concepts entail or make probable certain states of affairs which be confirmed or disconfirmed by experience. For example, suppose that, in honor of Richard Swinburne, we define a "Swinburne God" as

a being with most of the following properties: being a person without a body (that is, a spirit), present everywhere (that is, omnipresent), the creator of the universe, perfectly free, able to do anything (that is, omnipotent), knowing all things (that is, omniscient), perfectly good, a source of moral obligation, eternal, a necessary being, holy, and worthy of worship. [7]

Let "Swinburnian theism" be the proposition, "The Swinburne God exists." Swinburnian theism clearly entails other propositions; one does not need to know that one of those entailments is false in order to reasonably believe that one of those entailments (and, by extension, Swinburnian theism itself) is false.[8] This is why I think the second premise (step 2) of the "unknowability of local atheism" argument fails.

3.2: The Pragmatic Inconsistency of Believing Atheism Argument

In the last section, we saw that the unprovability of atheism argument is not successful, but can be at least partially repaired by transforming it into the unknowability of atheism argument. The conclusion of that argument is:

(5') It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to reasonably believe, "God does not exist," on an a posteriori basis.

Defenders of the pragmatic inconsistency argument should then revise the last three steps as follows.

(6') The action of reasonably believing, "God does not exist," presupposes that the speaker is God. 

From (5') and (6'), it follows that: 

(7') If a finite, mortal being reasonably believes, "God does not exist," on an a posteriori basis then it is true that God does not exist and it is false that God does not exist.

From (7') and the Law of Noncontradiction, it follows that: 

(8') It is impossible for a finite, mortal being to reasonably believe, "God does not exist," on an a posteriori basis. 

This argument fails for two reasons. First, its second premise, (6'), is false. Even if it is impossible for finite, mortal beings to reasonably believe atheism on an a posteriori basis, it does not follow that it is impossible for such beings to reasonably believe atheism on an a priori basis. One does not have to be omniscient in order to know, much less reasonably believe, that there is a successful a priori argument for local atheism.

For example, here is one schema for what I call an "internal inconsistency argument" for local atheism.

(9) If God existed, then He would have property P1.

(10) If God existed, then He would have property P2.

(11) Any being with property P1 would have some further property P3.

(12) Any being with property P2 would not have property P3.

(13) Therefore, it is impossible for any being to have properties P1 and P2. (from 11 and 12)

(14) Hence, it is impossible for God to exist. (from 9, 10 and 13)

The basic idea is to show that if God existed, then he would have two properties P1 and P2. The next step is to show that property P1 entails some third property P3, while property P2 entails the denial of property P3. Since it is impossible for any being both to have and not have P3, it follows that that being cannot exist. While it might or might not be the case that there are no successful arguments of this type for local atheism, it really doesn't matter one way or the other for the purpose of this post. The speaker does not need to be omniscient in order to know the truth of (9) - (12).

Second, the argument's conclusion, (8'), does not follow from (5') - (7'). (6') refers to the action of claiming to reasonably believe, "God does not exist," but does not specify that that knowledge is based upon an a posteriori basis.

As with the unknowability of atheism argument, let us now consider two versions of the pragmatic inconsistency argument based on the distinction between global and local atheism. The global version can be summarized as follows:

(5*) It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to reasonably believe global atheism on an a posteriori basis.

(6*) The action of reasonably believing global atheism presupposes that the speaker is God. 

Therefore:

(7*) If a finite, mortal being reasonably believes global atheism on an a posteriori basis, then global atheism is true and global atheism is false.

Therefore:

(8*) It is impossible for a finite, mortal being to reasonably believe global atheism on an a posteriori basis. 

There are two problems with this argument. The first is that it is invalid: (6*) refers to the action of claiming to reasonably believe global atheism but does not specify that that knowledge is based upon an a posteriori basis. It seems to me that this objection could be avoided by revising the argument again as follows:

(5**) It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to reasonably believe global atheism.

(6**) The action of reasonably believing global atheism presupposes that the speaker is God. 

Therefore:

(7**) If a finite, mortal being reasonably believes global atheism, then global atheism is true and global atheism is false.

Therefore:

(8**) It is impossible for a finite, mortal being to reasonably believe global atheism.

That solves the problem identified by the first objection, but brings into sharper focus the second objection. Even if we assume that premise (5**) can be adequately defended, premise (6**) does not seem to be true. If premise (5**) is true, then it seems that the action of claiming to reasonably believe global atheism presupposes that the speaker has knowledge which greatly exceeds that of any human being in history. But "has knowledge which greatly exceeds that of any human being in history" is not a sufficient condition for being God. First, it's far from obvious that such knowledge requires omniscience, and many conceptions of God posit an omniscient being, not just a really smart being. Second, even if the speaker's actions did presuppose that the speaker is omniscient, being omniscient is not a sufficient condition for being God. It is at least conceivable that there exists an omniscient being which does not have any of the other attributes typically associated with God, such as omnipotence, moral perfection, eternity, aseity, sovereignty, immutability, necessity, etc.  

I don't know how Bahnsen would respond to this objection. Perhaps Bahnsen could show that the speaker's actions require such a superhuman degree of knowledge that the speaker's actions presuppose that the speaker is not necessarily God, but at least a supernatural being. Since metaphysical naturalism rules out the existence of any supernatural beings, not just God, the argument could then be transformed into a pragmatic inconsistency argument against believing metaphysical naturalism. 

Now consider the local version of the pragmatic inconsistency argument, which can be summarized as follows:

(5#) It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to reasonably believe local atheism on an a posteriori basis.

(6#) The action of reasonably believing local atheism presupposes that the speaker is God. 

Therefore:

(7#) If a finite, mortal being reasonably believes global atheism on an a posteriori basis, then global atheism is true and global atheism is false.

Therefore:

(8#) It is impossible for a finite, mortal being to reasonably believe local atheism on an a posteriori basis.  

This argument suffers from the same defects as its global counterpart. Unlike the global pragmatic inconsistency argument, however, I am doubtful that the second premise, in this case (6#), can be repaired by replacing "God" with "supernatural being." For ordinary human knowledge is all that is needed to reasonably believe that some local theisms are false. Thus, the action of claiming to reasonably believe local atheism does not appear to be a pragmatic inconsistency, at least not in any sense related to the issues discussed in this post. 

4: Conclusion

In this post, I have considered two arguments: the unprovability of atheism argument and the pragmatic inconsistency of knowing atheism argument. The unprovability of atheism argument is best and most charitably understood as the unknowability of atheism argument, which has two versions. The unknowability of global atheism argument seems promising, but the unknowability of local atheism argument fails. For at least some concepts of "God," one can reasonably believe that local atheism is true. Finally, the pragmatic inconsistency argument fails because one does not need to be superhuman, much less omniscient, in order to reasonably believe the truth of the premises of an internal inconsistency argument. Perhaps there is a successful global pragmatic inconsistency argument (against the action of believing naturalism), but the local pragmatic inconsistency argument seems hopeless.[9]

Notes

[1] “Michael Martin Under the Microscope” audiocassette, tape 3.

[2] William Lane Craig, “Second Rebuttal Speech” Atheism vs. Christianity (January 1993), https://www.reasonablefaith.org/media/debates/atheism-vs.-christianity

[3] Thanks to Paul Draper for helping me to see this clearly.

[4] Diller, J. "Global and local atheisms." Int J Philos Relig 79, 7–18 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-015-9550-1

[5] J.L. Schellenberg, Progressive Atheism: How Moral Evolution Changes the God Debate (New York: Bloombsury, 2019), p. 50.

[6] Paul Draper, "Panpsychotheism." In Current Controversies in Philosophy of Religion (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 160-177.

[7] Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism (2nd ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 1.

[8] For an example of such an argument, see Paul Draper's formulation and defense of his "Decisive Evidence Argument" in Draper, Paul, "Atheism and Agnosticism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2022/entries/atheism-agnosticism/>.

[9] Thanks to Paul Draper for some very helpful conversations which significantly improved the quality of this post. Any errors are, of course, solely my responsibility.

The Columbine Mass Shooting and the Myth of Cassie Bernall's Martyrdom

Mark D. Linville has published a short booklet with Ravi Zacharias International Ministries (RZIM) entitled, "Is Everything Permitted? Moral Values in a World Without God?" The booklet begins with the following statement by Linville:

Few news stories have had the profound effect on me as did the shooting rampage at Columbine High School.

Can you guess where this is headed? Linville continues:

More on Plantinga, Atheism, and Moral Obligation

Today I remembered Plantinga wrote a very interesting article on naturalism and obligation back in 2010 in the journal Faith and Philosophy. I just checked my archives and made an interesting discovery. First, that article reinforces my belief that Plantinga believes atheism (and, indeed, naturalism) and moral obligation are incompatible. Second, in that article, Plantinga explicitly says he is not going to argue directly for that incompatibility claim; rather, he intends to "display" the failure of the most natural way of arguing that naturalism can accommodate moral obligation. In his own words:

I propose to support the claim that naturalism cannot accommodate morality—not by showing directly that it can’t, but by displaying the failure of the most natural way of arguing that it can.

Imagine how Plantinga would have reacted if Mackie said, "I'm not going to directly argue for the claim that God and evil are incompatible. Rather, I'm going to indirectly argue for it by displaying the failure of the most natural way of arguing that God and evil are compatible." Surely Plantinga would have replied: "Even if Mackie succeeds at that task, that still falls short of what he needs to defend his logical argument from evil: a rigorous defense of the claim that God and evil are incompatible." And Plantinga would have been right.

By similar reasoning, then, it seems to me that the Autonomous Morality Defender ("Defender") would be just as correct to use a parallel reply to Plantinga. Even if Plantinga's article succeeds in showing that the "most natural way of arguing that" naturalism can "accommodate morality" fails, Plantinga would still fall short of what he needs to defend his 'logical' argument from morality for theism.

Can We Show There is No Inconsistency between Atheism and Moral Obligation?

In a prior post, I showed that Plantinga has failed to demonstrate a contradiction between atheism and moral obligation in any of this three types of contradiction: explicit, formal, or implicit. I want to continue to my exploration of the alleged contradiction between atheism and moral obligation, this time by asking if we can show that there is no inconsistency between atheism and moral obligation. 

In the spirit of maximal transparency, what follows is mostly plagiarized material from Plantinga's book, God, Freedom, and Evil, Part I, Section a, sub-section 3, with the obvious exception that I have edited the material referring to God and evil with my own material referring to atheism and moral obligation. 

Assessing the Resurrection Hypothesis: McCullagh, Craig, Cavin, and Colombetti

In this post, I want to consider the assessment of historical hypotheses such as the alleged resurrection of Jesus (R), using the writings of William Lane Craig as a foil. In doing so, I will rely heavily upon a recent article by philosophers Robert Greg Cavin and Carolos Colombetti, but I want to be clear that I have not reviewed this post with them, so any mistakes in this post are entirely my responsibility.

While Craig's position regarding the use of Bayes' Theorem has evolved over the years, to my knowledge one thing which has not changed is his reliance upon the work of historian C. Behan McCullagh.[1] Following McCullagh, Craig argues for R using an argument pattern called "inference to the best explanation" (IBE).[2] In this post, I will argue the following three points contra Craig. First, Bayes' Theorem is the foundation for logically correct arguments for any historical hypotheses. Second, neither McCullagh's IBE criteria nor Craig's restatement of them are sufficiently clear to enable a rigorous assessment of historical hypotheses, whereas the Bayesian approach avoids these problems. Third, Craig's defense of R fails to establish that the alleged event is more probable than not.

Divine Nature Theory vs. Abstract Objects

Plato holding his Timaeus, detail from the Vatican fresco The School of Athens

Source: Web Gallery of Art; License: Public Domain

According to what I call the "Divine Nature Theory" of axiology or value (hereafter, DNT-A), value is grounded in God's nature. In contrast, moral anti-reductionism (usually called "ethical non-naturalism") says that moral value is grounded in sui generis, non-natural properties.

What is the advantage of DNT-A over moral anti-reductionism?  According to DNT-A, God’s nature, not God, is the source of moral value.  But what is the distinction between God and His nature?  God’s nature is simply the collection of God’s properties or attributes (e.g., omniscience, omnipotence, etc.).  But if that is the case, then why do we need God in order for moral value to supervene on one or more of such properties?  Or to put the point differently, why must those properties be instantiated in the person of God in order for the supervenience relationship to hold? Why can't they just exist as abstract properties? And if such properties do not need to be instantiated in the person of God, then what is the advantage of the divine nature theory over moral anti-reductionism?